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Scarce-resource capacity sharing in cognitive radio environments: a new game theoretical model

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Abstract

The paper proposes a general game theoretical model, called capacity demand game, for treating simultaneous capacity requests in scarce-resource cognitive radio (CR) environments. The approach is that of non-cooperative games describing CR interactions in terms of radio resource access. Experiments reveal stable states (equilibria) that favour an equitable usage of radio resources to the benefit of all participants. Several equilibria are detected and discussed: Nash (NE), Pareto, joint Nash–Pareto, and Lorenz equilibrium.

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Acknowledgements

This paper was partially supported by The Technical University of Cluj-Napoca internal competition Project 24311/2013-2014.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Communications Department, Technical University of Cluj-Napoca, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

    Ligia Cremene, Marcel Cremene & Aurel Vlaicu

  2. Computer Science Department, Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca, Cluj-Napoca, Romania

    Noémi Gaskó, Mihai Suciu & D. Dumitrescu

Authors
  1. Ligia Cremene
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  2. Noémi Gaskó
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  3. Marcel Cremene
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  4. Mihai Suciu
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  5. Aurel Vlaicu
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  6. D. Dumitrescu
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Correspondence to Marcel Cremene.

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Cremene, L., Gaskó, N., Cremene, M. et al. Scarce-resource capacity sharing in cognitive radio environments: a new game theoretical model. Telecommun Syst 66, 331–342 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-017-0292-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11235-017-0292-5

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