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Scientific realism: quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism

  • S.I.: New Thinking about Scientific Realism
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Abstract

This Introduction has two foci: the first is a discussion of the motivation for and the aims of the 2014 conference on New Thinking about Scientific Realism in Cape Town South Africa, and the second is a brief contextualization of the contributed articles in this special issue of Synthese in the framework of the conference. Each focus is discussed in a separate section.

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Notes

  1. There was also a so-called ‘historical’ turn in the philosophy of science in the decades after World War II, which had mostly anti-realist implications for the realism question. This ‘turn’ was led by Thomas Kuhn.

  2. The conference was organised by the Departments of Philosophy at the University of Pretoria and the University of Johannesburg. The conference was funded by the Faculties of Humanities at the University of Pretoria and the University of Johannesburg, and the South African National Research Foundation’s ‘Knowledge, Interchange and Collaboration Fund’.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Athens, University Campus, 15771, Athens, Greece

    Stathis Psillos

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, 0002, Republic of South Africa

    Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem

  3. Meraka Centre for Artificial Intelligence Research, Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, PO Box 395, Pretoria, 0001, Republic of South Africa

    Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem

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  1. Stathis Psillos
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  2. Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem
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Correspondence to Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem.

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Psillos, S., Ruttkamp-Bloem, E. Scientific realism: quo vadis? Introduction: new thinking about scientific realism. Synthese 194, 3187–3201 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1493-x

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