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Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence

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Abstract

It is increasingly recognized that knowledge is the norm of assertion. As this view has gained popularity, it has also garnered criticism. One widely discussed criticism involves thought experiments about “selfless assertion.” Selfless assertions are said to be intuitively compelling examples where agents should assert propositions that they don’t even believe and, hence, don’t know. This result is then taken to show that knowledge is not the norm of assertion. This paper reports four experiments demonstrating that “selfless assertors” are viewed as both believing and knowing the propositions they assert: this is the natural and intuitive way of interpreting the case. Thought experiments about selfless assertions do not threaten the knowledge account and they do not motivate weaker alternative accounts. The discussion also highlights a general lesson for philosophers: thought experiments intended to probe for mental state attributions should not conflict with basic principles that guide social cognition.

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Acknowledgments

For helpful feedback, I thank Wesley Buckwalter, Angelo Turri, and the editor and two anonymous referees for Synthese. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and an Early Researcher Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation.

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  1. Philosophy Department and Cognitive Science Program, University of Waterloo, 200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON, N2L3G1, Canada

    John Turri

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  1. John Turri
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Correspondence to John Turri.

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Turri, J. Selfless assertions: some empirical evidence. Synthese 192, 1221–1233 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0621-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0621-0

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