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Variations on a Montagovian theme

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Abstract

What are the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity? For at least some of these properties, it seems plausible that the objects are sentences, or sentence-like entities. However, results from mathematical logic indicate that sentential properties are subject to severe formal limitations. After surveying these results, I argue that they are more problematic than often assumed, that they can be avoided by taking the objects of the relevant property to be coarse-grained (“sets of worlds”) propositions, and that all this has little to do with the choice between operators and predicates.

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  1. RSSS School of Philosophy, ANU, Canberra, ACT, 0200, Australia

    Wolfgang Schwarz

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  1. Wolfgang Schwarz
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Correspondence to Wolfgang Schwarz.

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Schwarz, W. Variations on a Montagovian theme. Synthese 190, 3377–3395 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0173-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0173-0

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