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The problem of the basing relation

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Abstract

In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the pedestrian observation that beliefs stand or fall with their bases. The theory I offer is an elucidation and refinement of this thought.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Social Sciences Bldg. 213, P.O. Box 210027, Tucson, AZ, 85721-0027, USA

    Ian Evans

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  1. Ian Evans
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Correspondence to Ian Evans.

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Evans, I. The problem of the basing relation. Synthese 190, 2943–2957 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0111-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0111-1

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