Abstract
In this paper, I respond to recent attempts by philosophers to deny the existence of something that is both real and significant: reasonable disagreements between epistemic peers. In their arguments against the possibility of such disagreements, skeptical philosophers typically invoke one or more of the following: indifference reasoning, equal weight principles, and uniqueness theses. I take up each of these in turn, finding ample reason to resist them. The arguments for indifference reasoning and equal weight principles tend to overlook the possibility of a certain kind of agnostic credal state which I call deep agnosticism, the possibility of which derails the arguments. The arguments for uniqueness theses tend to invoke a flawed understanding of the evidential support relation. When these problems and misunderstandings are brought into the light and corrected, the threat to reasonable disagreement vanishes.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Bogardus T. (2009) A vindication of the equal-weight view. Episteme 6(3): 324–335
Christensen D. (2007) Epistemology of disagreement: The good news. Philosophical Review 116(2): 187–217
Conee E., Feldman R. (2004) Evidentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Elga A. (2007) Reflection and disagreement. Noûs 41(3): 478–502
Feldman R. (2006) Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In: Hetherington S. (eds) Epistemology futures. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Feldman R. (2007) Reasonable religious disagreements. In: Antony L. (eds) Philosophers without Gods. Oxford: University Press, Oxford, pp 194–214
Gutting G. (1982) Religious belief and religious skepticism. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame
A. G., A. G. (2003) What conditional probabilities could not be. Synthese 137: 273–323
Jehle D., Fitelson B. (2009) What is the “equal weight view”?. Episteme 6(3): 280–293
Joyce J. (2005) How probabilities reflect evidence. Philosophical Perspectives 19: 153–178
Kelly T. (2005) The epistemic significance of disagreement. In: Hawthorne J., Szabo T. G. (eds) Oxford studies in epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 167–196
Quine W. (1960) Word and object. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Shogenji, T. (2007). My way or her way: A conundrum in bayesian epistemology of disagreement. http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~fitelson/few/few_07/shogenji.pdf.
Sturgeon S. (2008) Reason and the grain of belief. Noûs 42: 139–165
van Fraassen B. (1990) Figures in a probability landscape. In: Dunn J., Gupta A. (eds) Truth or consequence. Kluwer, Dordrecht
Walley P. (1991) Statistical reasoning with imprecise probabilities. Chapman and Hall, London
White R. (2005) Epistemic permissiveness. In: Hawthorne J. (eds) Philosophical perspectives. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 445–459
White R. (2009) On treating oneself and others as thermometers. Episteme 6(3): 233–250
White R. (2010) Evidential symmetry and mushy credence. In: Gendler T.S., Hawthorne J (eds) Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3). Oxford University Press, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Decker, J. Disagreement, evidence, and agnosticism. Synthese 187, 753–783 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0010-x
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0010-x