Abstract
This paper aims to make three contributions to decision theory. First there is the hope that it will help to re-establish the legitimacy of the problem, pace various recent analyses provided by Maitzen and Wilson, Slezak and Priest. Second, after pointing out that analyses of the problem have generally relied upon evidence that is conditional on the taking of one particular option, this paper argues that certain assumptions implicit in those analyses are subtly flawed. As a third contribution, the piece aims to draw attention to an important similarity between Newcomb’s problem and the toxin puzzle. In short, both problems illustrate the fact that you can have a reason to intend to φ without having a reason to actually φ.
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Burgess, S. Newcomb’s problem and its conditional evidence: a common cause of confusion. Synthese 184, 319–339 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9816-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9816-1