Abstract
Logic is breaking out of the confines of the single-agent static paradigm that has been implicit in all formal systems until recent times. We sketch some recent developments that take logic as an account of information-driven interaction. These two features, the dynamic and the social, throw fresh light on many issues within logic and its connections with other areas, such as epistemology and game theory.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Dégremont, C., Zvesper, J. Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam School on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth. Synthese 179, 223–238 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9779-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9779-2