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Indexicals, context-sensitivity and the failure of implication

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Abstract

This paper investigates, formulates and proves an indexical barrier theorem, according to which sets of non-indexical sentences do not entail (except under specified special circumstances) indexical sentences. It surveys the usual difficulties for this kind of project, as well some that are specific to the case of indexicals, and adapts the strategy of Restall and Russell’s “Barriers to Implication” to overcome these. At the end of the paper a reverse barrier theorem is also proved, according to which an indexical sentence will not, except under specified circumstances, entail a non-indexical one.

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  1. Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA

    Gillian Russell

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  1. Gillian Russell
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Correspondence to Gillian Russell.

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Russell, G. Indexicals, context-sensitivity and the failure of implication. Synthese 183, 143–160 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9756-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9756-9

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