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How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009)

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Abstract

Crupi et al. (Think Reason 14:182–199, 2008) have recently advocated and partially worked out an account of the conjunction fallacy phenomenon based on the Bayesian notion of confirmation. In response, Schupbach (2009) presented a critical discussion as following from some novel experimental results. After providing a brief restatement and clarification of the meaning and scope of our original proposal, we will outline Schupbach’s results and discuss his interpretation thereof arguing that they do not actually undermine our point of view if properly construed. Finally, we will foster such a claim by means of some novel data.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Trento, Trento, Italy

    Katya Tentori

  2. University College London, London, UK

    Katya Tentori

  3. University of Turin, Turin, Italy

    Vincenzo Crupi

Authors
  1. Katya Tentori
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  2. Vincenzo Crupi
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Correspondence to Vincenzo Crupi.

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Tentori, K., Crupi, V. How the conjunction fallacy is tied to probabilistic confirmation: Some remarks on Schupbach (2009). Synthese 184, 3–12 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9701-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9701-y

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