Abstract
Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed.
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Acknowledgments
Thanks to the audience of the workshop ‘Confirmation, Probability, and Fallacies’ in Leuven for their remarks, to Tomoji Shogenji for his detailed comments afterwards, and to Tom Stoneham and Christoph Jäger for their reactions to earlier versions of this paper.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Peijnenburg, J. A case of confusing probability and confirmation. Synthese 184, 101–107 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9692-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9692-8