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Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths

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Abstract

The paper seeks a perfectly general argument regarding the non-contingent limits to any (human or non-human) knowledge. After expressing disappointment with the history of philosophy on this score, an argument is grounded in Fitch’s proof, which demonstrates the unknowability of some truths. The necessity of this unknowability is then defended by arguing for the necessity of Fitch’s premise—viz., there this is in fact some ignorance.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Richard Routley

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  1. Richard Routley
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Additional information

This paper was originally published in 1981 as “Necessary Limits to Knowledge: Unknowable Truths,” in M. Edgar, N. Otto, and Z. Gerhard (eds.), Essays in Scientific Philosophy. Dedicated to Paul Weingartner/Philosophie als Wissenschaft. Paul Weingartner gewidmet, Bad Reichenhall: Comes Verlag, 93–115. The author died in 1996. The paper is reprinted here by kind permission of the estate. Richard Routley—Formerly Senior Fellow at Australian National University.

The address of Routley (Sylvan) executor, Nicholas Griffin: MacMaster University, Department of Philosophy, University Hall 309, Hamilton, Ontario L8S4L8, Canada, e-mail: ngriffin@mcmaster.ca

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Routley, R. Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths. Synthese 173, 107–122 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9679-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9679-5

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