Abstract
My aim in this paper is to articulate an account of scientific modeling that reconciles pluralism about modeling with a modest form of scientific realism. The central claim of this approach is that the models of a given physical phenomenon can present different aspects of the phenomenon. This allows us, in certain special circumstances, to be confident that we are capturing genuine features of the world, even when our modeling occurs independently of a wholly theoretical motivation. This framework is illustrated using a recent debate from meteorology.
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at Models and Simulations 2, Tilburg University, October 2007. I would like to thank the members of the audience for their helpful comments and criticisms, especially Rafaela Hillerbrand, Wendy Parker, Jan Sprenger and Mauricio Suárez. The final version was greatly improved by suggestions from Anjan Chakravartty and an anonymous referee.
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Pincock, C. Modeling reality. Synthese 180, 19–32 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9564-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9564-2