Skip to main content
Log in

New account of empirical claims in structuralism

  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper, a new account of empirical claims in structuralism is developed. Its novelty derives from the use that is made of the linguistic approach to scientific theories despite the presumed incompatibility of structuralism with that approach. It is shown how the linguistic approach can be applied to the framework of structuralism if the semantic foundations of that approach are refined to do justice to the doctrine of indirect interpretation of theoretical terms. This doctrine goes back to Carnap but has been advanced until the present day without a proper semantic explanation.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Andreas, H. (2007). Carnaps Wissenschaftslogik. Eine Untersuchung zur Zweistufenkonzeption. Paderborn: Mentis.

  • Andreas, H. (2009). A modal view of the semantics of theoretical sentences. Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9458-3.

  • Balzer W., Moulines C.U. (2000) Introduction. In: Balzer W., Moulines C.U., Sneed J. (eds) Structuralist knowledge representation. Paradigmatic examples. Rodopi., Amsterdam, pp 3–18

    Google Scholar 

  • Balzer W., Moulines C.U., Sneed J. (1987) An architectonic for science. The structuralist program. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap R. (1937) The logical syntax of language. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap R. (1939) Foundations of logic and mathematics. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap R. (1956) The methodological character of theoretical concept. In: Feigel H., Scriven M. (eds) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science I. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, pp 38–76

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnap R. (1958) Beobachtungssprache und theoretische Sprache. Dialectica 12: 236–248

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ludwig G. (1978) Die Grundstrukturen einer physikalischen Theorie. Springer-Verlag, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Moulines C.U. (1996) Structuralism: The basic ideas. In: Balzer W., Moulines C.U. (eds) Structuralist theory of science. Focal issues, new results. deGruyter, Berlin-New York, pp 1–13

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramsey F.P. (1950) Theories. In: Braithwaite R.B. (eds) The foundations of mathematics and other logical essays. Humanities Press, New York, pp 212–236

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheibe E. (1982) A comparison of two recent views on theories. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 3(2): 233–253

    Google Scholar 

  • Sneed J. (1979) The logical structure of mathematical physics. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Stegmüller W. (1976) The structure and dynamics of theories. Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuomela R. (1973) Theoretical concepts. Springer-Verlag, Wien

    Google Scholar 

  • van Fraassen B. (1969) Presuppositions, supervaluations and free logic. In: Lambert K. (eds) The logical way of doing things. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 67–91

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Holger Andreas.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Andreas, H. New account of empirical claims in structuralism. Synthese 176, 311–332 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9561-5

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9561-5

Keywords

Navigation