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Elusive epistemological justification

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Abstract

What does it take for some epistemological thinking to be epistemically justified? Indeed, is that outcome even possible? This paper argues that it is not possible: no epistemological thinking can ever be epistemically justified. A vicious infinite regress of epistemological reflection is the price that would have to be paid for having some such justification. Clearly, that price would be too high.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

    Stephen Hetherington

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  1. Stephen Hetherington
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Correspondence to Stephen Hetherington.

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An earlier version of this paper was presented at UNSW in 1992 (with the title, “Lacking Knowledge and Justification By Theorizing About Them”). That earlier version was cited by Lewis (1996, 550 n.). Since then, the paper has been presented at the 2008 Australasian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference. I am grateful for the excellent comments made on those occasions. Helpful suggestions by two anonymous referees were also very welcome.

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Hetherington, S. Elusive epistemological justification. Synthese 174, 315–330 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9451-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9451-2

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