Abstract
We investigate the research programme of dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) and analyze its underlying methodology. The Ramsey test for conditionals is used to characterize the logical and philosophical differences between two paradigmatic systems, AGM and KGM, which we develop and compare axiomatically and semantically. The importance of Gärdenfors’s impossibility result on the Ramsey test is highlighted by a comparison with Arrow’s impossibility result on social choice. We end with an outlook on the prospects and the future of DDL.
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Leitgeb, H., Segerberg, K. Dynamic doxastic logic: why, how, and where to?. Synthese 155, 167–190 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9143-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9143-8