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A Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics Part I: Arithmetic

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Abstract

In this paper I present a formalist philosophy mathematics and apply it directly to Arithmetic. I propose that formalists concentrate on presenting compositional truth theories for mathematical languages that ultimately depend on formal methods. I argue that this proposal occupies a lush middle ground between traditional formalism, fictionalism, logicism and realism.

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References

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  4. van Benthem, J., ‘Higher-order logic’, in D. M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd Edition, volume 1, Kluwer, 2001, pp. 189–244.

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Correspondence to Michael Gabbay.

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Gabbay, M. A Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics Part I: Arithmetic. Stud Logica 96, 219–238 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9283-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9283-1

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