Abstract
In this paper I present a formalist philosophy mathematics and apply it directly to Arithmetic. I propose that formalists concentrate on presenting compositional truth theories for mathematical languages that ultimately depend on formal methods. I argue that this proposal occupies a lush middle ground between traditional formalism, fictionalism, logicism and realism.
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Gabbay, M. A Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics Part I: Arithmetic. Stud Logica 96, 219–238 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9283-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-010-9283-1