Abstract
One of the most prominent objections to skeptical theism in recent literature is that the skeptical theist is forced to deny our competency in making judgments about the all-things-considered value of any natural event. Some skeptical theists accept that their view has this implication, but argue that it is not problematic. I think that there is reason to question the implication itself. I begin by explaining the objection to skeptical theism and the standard response to it. I then identify an assumption that is prevalent in much of the literature concerning the problem of evil, and show that it is a factor in motivating commitment to the implication I mean to question. I argue that the assumption is false, and that once it is rejected there is room to endorse the skeptical theist’s strategy in responding to some arguments from evil without endorsing the putative implication that objectors find unacceptable.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Almeida M., Oppy G. (2003) Sceptical theism and evidential arguments from evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81(4): 496–516
Almeida, M., & Oppy, G. (2005). Reply to Trakakis and Nagasawa. Ars Disputandi 5. Retrieved September 24, 2005 from http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000220/article.pdf.
Bergmann M. (2001) Skeptical theism and Rowe’s new evidential argument from evil. Nous 35(2): 278–296
Bergmann M. (2009) Skeptical theism and the problem of evil. In: Thomas F., Michael R. (eds) Oxford handbook to philosophical theology. OUP, New York, pp 374–399
Bergmann M., Rea M. (2005) In defense of skeptical theism: A reply to Almeida and Oppy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83: 241–251
Hasker W. (1992) The necessity of gratuitous evil. Faith and Philosophy 9: 23–44
Hasker W. (2010) All too skeptical theism. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68: 15–29
Howard-Snyder D., Howard-Snyder F. (1999) Is theism compatible with gratuitous suffering?. American Philosophical Quarterly 36(2): 115–129
Jordan J. (2006) Does skeptical theism lead to moral skepticism?. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72(2): 403–417
Maitzen S. (2008) Skeptical theism and moral obligation. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65: 93–103
Maitzen S. (2009) Ordinary morality implies atheism. European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 2: 107–126
Murray M. (2008) Nature red in tooth and claw. OUP, New York, p 206
Rowe W. (1979) The problem of evil and some varieties of atheism. American Philosophical Quarterly 16: 335–341
Russell B. (2004) The problem of evil: Why is there so much suffering?. In: Louis P. (ed.) Introduction to philosophy: Classical and contemporary readings. OUP, New York, pp 207–213
Trakakis, N. & Nagasawa, Y. (2004). Skeptical theism and moral skepticism: A reply to Almeida and Oppy. Ars Disputandi 4. Retrieved December 5, 2011 from http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000178/article.pdf.
Wykstra S. (1984) The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: On avoiding the evils of “appearance”. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16(2): 73–93
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Anderson, D.J. Skeptical theism and value judgments. Int J Philos Relig 72, 27–39 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9358-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-012-9358-1