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Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens

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Abstract

Elinor Ostrom, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner in economic science, has made significant contributions throughout her career to the disciplines of political economy and public choice. This article focuses on her contributions to our understanding of how rules of self-governance can produce cooperation out of situations of conflict over resource use. Through the use of a multiple-methods approach to political economy, Ostrom has demonstrated in a variety of historical circumstances and within a diversity of institutional environments how individuals can craft rules so that they can live better together in their communities and realize the gains from social cooperation under the division of labor.

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  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Peter Boettke

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  1. Peter Boettke
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Correspondence to Peter Boettke.

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BB&T Chair for the Study of Capitalism at Mercatus Center, and University Professor of Economics, George Mason University. Paul Dragos Aligica, Chris Coyne, Daniel D’Amico, Peter Leeson, Steve Medema, Mario Rizzo and Daniel Smith provided helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.

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Boettke, P. Is the only form of ‘reasonable regulation’ self regulation?: Lessons from Lin Ostrom on regulating the commons and cultivating citizens. Public Choice 143, 283–291 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9622-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9622-9

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