Abstract
We explore the role that campaign expenditures play in determining electoral outcomes. We study a two-party contest where campaign funds can affect the preferences of voters regarding the saliency of two political issues. We show that an advantage in campaign resources, a pre-campaign partisan advantage, an advantage on every salient issue, or a combination of these indicators, do not always guarantee electoral victory. By contrast, electoral victory is guaranteed if the sum of the proportions of the electorate supporting a party on every salient issue is greater than a critical value. For that to happen it is necessary (but not sufficient) that the party has an advantage on every salient issue.
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Amorós, P., Puy, M.S. Indicators of electoral victory. Public Choice 144, 239–251 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9514-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9514-z