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Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey

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“It is high time to shift out of the pragmatic mind-set that has been our national characteristic. The grand alternatives for social organization must be reconsidered. The loss of faith in the socialist dream has not, and probably will not, restore faith in laissez-faire. But what are the effective alternatives? Does anarchism deserve a hearing, and, if so, what sort of anarchism?”

James M. Buchanan (1974: 914)

Abstract

Public choice economists began studying anarchy in the 1970s. Since then, the amount of research on anarchy has burgeoned. This article surveys the important public choice contributions to the economics of anarchy. Following early public choice economists, many economists are researching how individuals interact without government. From non-public-interested explanations of the creation of government to historical studies of internalizing externalities under anarchy, public choice scholars are arriving at a more realistic perspective of human interaction with and without government. Although the economics of politics receives more attention, the economics of anarchy is an important area of research in public choice.

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  1. Department of Economics, Suffolk University, 8 Ashburton Place, Boston, MA, 02114, USA

    Benjamin Powell

  2. S.C. Davis Endowment, Trinity College, 300 Summit St., Hartford, CT, 06106, USA

    Edward P. Stringham

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Powell, B., Stringham, E.P. Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey. Public Choice 140, 503–538 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9407-1

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