Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

What does the European Union do?

  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to evaluate the attribution of policy prerogatives to European Union level institutions and compare them to the implications of normative policy models and to the preferences of European citizens. For this purpose we construct a set of indicators to measure the policy-making intensity of the European Union (European Council, Parliament, Commission, Court of Justice, etc.). We confirm that the extent and the intensity of policy-making by the EU have increased sharply over the last 30 years, but at different speeds, and in different degrees, across policy domains. In recent years the areas that have expanded most are quite remote from the EEC’s original mission of establishing a free market zone with common external trade policy. On the contrary some policy domains that would normally be attributed to the highest level of government remain at national level. We argue that the resulting allocation of prerogatives between the EU and member countries is partly inconsistent with normative criteria concerning the assignment of policies at different government levels, as laid out in the theoretical literature.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2002). Endogenous political institutions, mimeo.

  • Alesina, A., Angeloni, I., & Etro, F. (2001a). The political economy of international unions, CEPR Working Paper n. 3117.

  • Alesina, A., Angeloni, I., & Etro, F. (2001b). Institutional rules for federations, NBER Working Paper n. 8646.

  • Alesina, A., & Barro, R. (2002). Currency unions, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(2), 409–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., Barro, R., & Tenreyro, S. (2002). Optimal currency areas, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 17

  • Alesina, A., Blanchard, O., Gali, J., Giavazzi, F., & Uhlig, H. (2001c). Defining a macroeconomic framework for the Euro area Monitoring European Integration 3, Center for Economic Policy Research, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why, Journal of Economic Growth, 5, 33–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alesina, A., Glaeser, E., & Sacerdote, B. (2001). Why doesn’t the US have a European-style welfare state? Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2.

  • Alesina, A., & Spolaore, E. (1997). On the number and size of nation s, The Quarterly Journal of Economics.

  • Alesina, A., & Wacziarg, R. (1999). Is Europe going too far? Carnegie- Rochester Conference on Public Policy.

  • Boeri, T. (2000). Social Europe: Dramatic visions and real complexity, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2371

  • Boldrin, M., & Canova, F. (2001). Inequality and convergence: Reconsidering European regional policies, Economic Policy 32.

  • Danthine, J. P., Giavazzi, F., Vives, X., & von Thadden E. L. (1999). The future of European banking. Monitoring European Integration 9, Center for Economic Policy Research, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dur, R., & Roelfsema, H. (2002). Why does centralisation fail to internalise policy externalities?, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 02-056/3.

  • European Commission (2000). Report on financial stability, Economic Paper No. 143.

  • Issing, O., Gaspar, V., Angeloni, I., & Tristani, O. (2001). Monetary policy in the Euro-area, strategy and decision-making at the European central bank. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McCormick, J. (2000). The European Union, politics and policies (2nd ed.) (pp. xiii, 208). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mundell, R. (1961). Theory of optimum currency areas, The American Economic Review.

  • NATO (2001). NATO Handbook, Brussels.

  • Niskanen, W. (1971). Bureaucracy and representative government. New York: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nugent, N. (1999). The government and politics of the European Union. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oates, W. (1999). An essay on fiscal federalism, Journal of Economic Literature.

  • Padoa-Schioppa, T. (1987). Efficiency, stability and equity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peterson, J., & Bomberg, E. (1999). Decision-making in the European Union. London: Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pollack, M. A. (2000). The end of creeping competence? EU policy-making since Maastricht. Journal of Common Market Studies, 38, 519–538.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwarz, S. (2001). Die Europaeisierung der Umweltpolitik: Politisches Handeln im Mehrebenensystem, Berlin: Sigma.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tanzi, V., & Schuknecht, L. (2000). Public Spending in the 20th Century. A Global Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zilioli, C., & Selmayr, M. (1999). The European Central Bank, its system and its law, EUREDIA.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ludger Schuknecht.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Alesina, A., Angeloni, I. & Schuknecht, L. What does the European Union do?. Public Choice 123, 275–319 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7164-3

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-7164-3

Keywords

Navigation