Abstract
There is widespread disagreement about whether epistemic akrasia is possible. This paper argues that the possibility of epistemic akrasia follows from a traditional rationalist conception of epistemic critical reasoning, together with considerations about the fallibility of our capacities for reasoning. In addition to defending the view that epistemic akrasia is possible, we aim to shed light on why it is possible. By focusing on critical epistemic reasoning, we show how traditional rationalist assumptions about our core cognitive capacities help to explain the possibility of epistemic akrasia.
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Notes
This assumption seems to conflict with some characterizations of epistemic akrasia, which hold it requires that an individual holds a belief against one's better judgment, and thus seem to rule out the second case as a case of epistemic akrasia. See Hookway (2001), Davidson (1982, 1985), Owens (2002), Ribeiro (2011), and Borgoni (2015). We think this feature of their characterizations probably does not reflect deep disagreement with our assumption. There is no reason for these authors to deny that this second kind of mismatch is a kind of epistemic akrasia.
This Paderewski case bears on recent claims that epistemic akrasia can sometimes be rational. The case would show that rational epistemic akrasia is possible, if you accept Kripke’s view about the contents of beliefs in Paderewski-style cases, and you think that mismatches of the right kind are sufficient for epistemic akrasia. However, the examples others have used to argue that rational epistemic akrasia is possible are unlike our Paderewski case. In their examples, the individual is supposed to be rational even though she recognizes that her prescriptive belief conflicts with her akratic belief. Our argument in this paper does not depend on claims about whether rational epistemic akrasia is possible.
See, for example, Korsgaard (1996, p. 93), McDowell (1994, pp. 10–13), Scanlon (1998, p. 23), Burge (1996, p. 100), Parfit (2011, p. 120). These authors also claim that we have a parallel capacity for critical practical reasoning. Critical practical reasoning can be set aside for present purposes. Our use of ‘critical epistemic reasoning’ is compatible with two prevalent notions held by different authors. On one conception, the individual’s critical reasoning has the individual's mental states as part of its subject matter. For example, you might judge that you are inclined to discount evidence of George Zimmerman’s guilt because of a racially biased tendency to think of black men as dangerous. As a result of that insight about your psychology, you might come to believe that the known facts of the case actually are adequate grounds to believe he is guilty. An alternative characterization of critical reasoning construes it as about what considerations would justify such-and-such a belief, without any reflection on your own psychology. Critical reasoning about the Zimmerman case would go something like, “Zimmerman initiated the conflict by stalking Treyvon Martin; furthermore, he was armed and Treyvon Martin was not, and so Martin posed no grave threat of bodily harm. That is a sufficient reason for the conclusion that George Zimmerman is guilty. So he is guilty.” In our view, critical reasoning can take either of these forms, and both serve the purposes of our argument. In each type of critical reasoning, you form a belief on the basis of a higher-order belief that marks an epistemic prescription in favor of forming that belief.
Korsgaard and McDowell endorse the strong claim. Burge and Parfit reject it (op. cit.).
Here is a very brief sketch of our view of Lavin’s argument. His argument has three core moves. The first is to challenge arguments in favor of the view that reasoning generally implies the possibility of error. The main target there is an argument that says, without the possibility of error, reasoning would be no more active than the “play of mechanical forces,” and would involve no genuine contribution from the individual herself to the satisfaction of a norm. Lavin’s counter is that this claim about mechanism and an individual’s contribution is undefended. But he does not argue against the claim. In the second move, Lavin suggests that the view he opposes implies the “liberty of indifference”—it is always possible to make a choice against any principle. This “liberty of indifference” would be implied by the view that all reasoning requires the possibility of voluntary error. But it is not implied by the claim that all reasoning requires the possibility of rational error (that is, error that is directly avoidable through good reasoning). Typically, errors in reasoning are not voluntary. Third, Lavin suggests that there can be no perfectly rational agent if reasoning requires the possibility of error. That issue concerns difficult theological questions about perfection, like whether God could do what he necessarily would not do. We are unsure if Lavin is right about this implication for theology, but we are prepared to accept it.
Some of Lavin’s discussion suggests that he might accept this circumscribed claim about thoughts with explicit deontic or imperatival content. He says that acting on any explicitly prescriptive or deontic thoughts implies the possibility of error. He also says that an agent is subject to an imperative only if it is possible for the agent to violate it (op. cit., p. 441). (The latter remark does not focus specifically on action.) But he might not accept that the epistemic prescriptions involved in critical epistemic reasoning are imperatives—though he cannot reasonably deny that they are explicitly prescriptive thoughts.
See Hieronymi (2006) for detailed discussion of this point.
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Borgoni, C., Luthra, Y. Epistemic akrasia and the fallibility of critical reasoning. Philos Stud 174, 877–886 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0711-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0711-6