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What is nonconceptualism in Kant’s philosophy?

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to critically review several interpretations of Kantian sensible intuition. The first interpretation is the recent construal of Kantian sensible intuition as a mental analogue of a direct referential term. The second is the old, widespread assumption that Kantian intuitions do not refer to mind-independent entities, such as bodies and their physical properties, unless they are brought under categories. The third is the assumption that, by referring to mind-independent entities, sensible intuitions represent objectively in the sense that they represent in a relative, perspective-independent manner. The fourth is the construal of Kantian sensible intuitions as non-conceptual content. In this paper, I support the alternative view that Kantian sensible representation is to be seen as iconic de re presentation of objects without representational content.

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Notes

  1. I am especially indebted here to an anonymous referee who that gave me the opportunity to re-write this section and deepen my interpretation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira

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  1. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
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Correspondence to Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira.

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de Sá Pereira, R.H. What is nonconceptualism in Kant’s philosophy?. Philos Stud 164, 233–254 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9851-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9851-x

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