Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The evil of death and the Lucretian symmetry: a reply to Feldman

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In previous work we have defended the deprivation account of death’s badness against worries stemming from the Lucretian point that prenatal and posthumous nonexistence are deprivations of the same sort. In a recent article in this journal, Fred Feldman has offered an insightful critique of our Parfitian strategy for defending the deprivation account of death’s badness. Here we adjust, clarify, and defend our strategy for reply to Lucretian worries on behalf of the deprivation account.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For a contemporary presentation and defense of the "deprivation thesis" about death's badness, see Nagel (1970).

  2. It is a bit delicate to specify exactly what is being held fixed, and what is allowed to change, in evaluating the possibility that one have been born earlier. Some people express the regret that they weren't born in a different era--perhaps the 19th century, to pick a much-beloved period (by some perhaps romantic souls). But this kind of thought is not, strictly speaking, relevant to the Lucretian argument, which posits that one holds fixed at least central features of one's actual life and then imagines "additions" to it either at the beginning or end. Whereas it is quite tricky to evaluate such thought-experiments (and associated counterfactuals), we are not convinced that they are entirely incoherent. For some discussion of these issues, see: Brueckner and Martin Fischer (1993a, b, 1998).

  3. Brueckner and Fischer (1986) and Fischer (2009, pp. 27–36), Feldman coins the term, “The Pro Bias Toward Future Pleasures” in Feldman (2011).

  4. For the suggestion that the Pro-Bias Toward Future Pleasures can be defended as rational on evolutionary grounds, see Fischer (2006).

  5. Feldman (2011).

  6. Feldman (2011).

  7. Feldman (2011).

  8. Feldman (2011).

  9. Feldman (2011).

  10. Given that we do not offer a full defense of the rationality of the Pro Bias Toward the Future, we concede that our defense of the deprivation theory of death's badness against Lucretian worries is incomplete to some extent. We nevertheless believe that it makes substantial progress.

  11. Our view about rationality is similar in structure to the well-known view in epistemology according to which it is possible for S to have justification ("propositional justification") for believing a proposition which S does not in fact believe (e.g., the detective who has justification for believing that Jones is the murderer but does not believe that Jones is the murderer, because the detective has not put his evidence together and so fails to appreciate its cumulative force). This contrasts with "doxastic justification", an epistemic status that attaches to beliefs which S in fact has.

  12. Feldman (2011).

  13. For a development and (limited) defense of this idea, see Fischer, "Earlier birth and later death: symmetry through thick and thin."

References

  • Brueckner, A., & Fischer, J. M. (1986). Why is death bad? Philosophical Studies, 50, 213–221. (Reprinted in Fischer J. M. ed., The Metaphysics of Death, pp. 219–229).

  • Brueckner, A., & Fischer, J. M. (1993a). Death’s badness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 74, 37–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brueckner, A., & Fischer, J. M. (1993b). The asymmetry of early death and late birth. Philosophical Studies, 71, 37–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brueckner, A., & Fischer, J. M. (1998). Being born earlier. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 110–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Feldman, F. (2011). Brueckner and Fischer on the evil of death. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9766-6

  • Fischer, J. M. (2006) Earlier birth and later death: Symmetry through thick and thin. In R. Feldman, K. McDaniel & J. R. Raibley (Eds.), The good, the right, life and death (pp. 189–202) Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Reprinted in Fischer, Our Stories, pp. 63–77).

  • Fischer J. M. (2009). Our stories: essays on life, death, and free will. New York: Oxford University Press.

  • Nagel, T. (1970). Death. Nous,4, 73–80. (Reprinted in John Martin Fischer, ed., The metaphysics of death. Stanford: Stanford University Press, (1993), pp. 59–69).

Download references

Acknowledgments

We are extremely grateful to Fred Feldman for his generous and helpful comments on a previous version of this paper. Also, we have benefited greatly from insightful comments by an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Riverside, CA, 92521, USA

    John Martin Fischer

  2. Department of Philosophy, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, 93106, USA

    Anthony Brueckner

Authors
  1. John Martin Fischer
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Anthony Brueckner
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to John Martin Fischer.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Fischer, J.M., Brueckner, A. The evil of death and the Lucretian symmetry: a reply to Feldman. Philos Stud 163, 783–789 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9845-8

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9845-8

Keywords

Search

Navigation