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Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs

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References

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  1. University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

    Terry Horgan

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  1. Terry Horgan
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Correspondence to Terry Horgan.

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Horgan, T. Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs . Philos Stud 153, 447–455 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2

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