, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 447-455
Date: 02 Sep 2010

Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs

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Perception and Basic Beliefs is a fine book. The overall dialectic is always kept clearly in view for the reader. The arguments are vigorously presented, are always provocative, and are often quite persuasive. The book is very well informed, both about the contours of recent epistemology and about pertinent work in cognitive science. The writing is elegant, crisp, and uncluttered. Lyons’ way of parsing the landscape of epistemological positions concerning justified belief is very illuminating, especially because of his emphasis on the distinction between evidential and non-evidential forms of justification. The book was a pleasure to read, and I recommend it very strongly to any philosopher or philosophy graduate student interested in epistemology.

That said, I also find myself in fairly strong disagreement with the position Lyons stakes out. My main goal here will be to explain why I am not persuaded by his overall argument, which will involve saying some things along the way about key ...