Abstract
In this paper I offer from a source compatibilist’s perspective a critical discussion of Four Views on Free Will by John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Sharing Fischer’s semi-compatibilist view, I propose modifications to his arguments while resisting his coauthors’ objections. I argue against Kane that he should give up the requirement that a free and morally responsible agent be able to do otherwise (in relevant cases). I argue against Pereboom that his famed manipulation argument be resisted by contending that the agents in it are free and responsible. And I also argue against Vargas by challenging the sense in which his revisionist thesis differs from a position like Fischer’s and mine. I close by reflecting on the nature of desert. All seem to assume it is central to the debate, but what is it?
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For helping me to get clear on the questions that follow, especially the first two, I am indebted to Randolph Clarke, who first brought these issues to my attention in his fall 2007 seminar on Moral Responsibility at Florida State University.
References
Fischer, J. M. (2004). Responsibility and manipulation. The Journal of Ethics, 8, 145–177.
Fischer, J. M., Kane, R., Pereboom, D., & Vargas, M. (2007). Four views on free will. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: An essay on moral responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haji, I. (1998). Moral appraisability. New York: Oxford University Press.
McKenna, M. (2003). Robustness, control, and the demand for morally significant alternatives. In D. Widerker & M. McKenna (Eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities.
McKenna, M. (2008). A hard-line reply to Pereboom’s four-case argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77(1), 142–159.
Pereboom, D. (2001). Living without free will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Schoeman, F. (Ed.). (1987). Responsibility, character, and the emotions: New essays in moral psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shabo, S. (forthcoming). Uncompromising source incompatibilism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
Smith, M. (2003). Rational capacities, or: How to distinguish recklessness, weakness, and compulsion. In S. Stroud & C. Tappolet (Eds.) (pp. 17–38).
Stroud, S., & Tappolet, C. (Eds.). (2003). Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vivhelin, K. (2004). Free will demystified: A dispositional account. In Philosophical Topics, 32, 427–450.
Watson, G. (1987). Responsibility and the limits of evil: Variations on a Strawsonian theme. In F. Schoeman (Ed.) (pp. 256–286).
Widerker, D., & McKenna, M. (Eds.). (2003). Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
For helpful comments I would like to thank Randolph Clarke, John Martin Fischer, Alfred Mele, and Derk Pereboom.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
McKenna, M. Compatibilism & desert: critical comments on four views on free will . Philos Stud 144, 3–13 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9373-y
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9373-y