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Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance

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I argue against such “Higher-Order Intentionalist” theories of consciousness as the higher-order thought and inner sense views on the ground that they understand a subject’s awareness of his or her phenomenal characters to be intentional, like seeming-seeing, rather than “direct”, like seeing. The trouble with such views is that they reverse the order of explanation between phenomenal character and intentional awareness. A superior theory of consciousness takes the relation of awareness to be nonintentional.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, 215 Huron, rm. 1008, Toronto, ON, M55142, Canada

    Benj Hellie

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Hellie, B. Higher-Order Intentionality and Higher-Order Acquaintance. Philos Stud 134, 289–324 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-0241-0

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