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Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan

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Abstract

In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Ohio State University, USA

    Diana Raffman

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  1. Diana Raffman
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Correspondence to Diana Raffman.

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Raffman, D. Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan. Philos Stud 122, 189–202 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-9462-x

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-9462-x

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