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Kim Against Dualism

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Abstract

This paper presents and evaluates Jaegwon Kim’s recent argument against substance dualism. The argument runs as follows. Causal interaction between two entities requires pairing relations. Pairing relations are spatial relations, such as distance and orientation. Souls are supposedly nonspatial, immaterial substances. So it is hard to see how souls could enter into paired causal relations with material substances. I show that Kim’s argument against dualism fails. I conclude by sketching a way the substance dualist could meet Kim’s central challenge of explaining how souls and bodies are uniquely paired, allowing for them to enter into specific causal relationships, forming a singular soul–body unit.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Ithaca, NY, 14853-3201, USA

    David Jehle

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  1. David Jehle
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Correspondence to David Jehle.

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“Thanks to Neal Judisch, Dean Zimmerman, Max Goss, Robert O’Connor, John Heil, Sloan Lee, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Carl Ginet, and Deborah Smith for helpful comments. Thanks also to the audience at the Ohio Philosophical Association Annual Meeting 2004 for helpful comments and suggestions.”

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Jehle, D. Kim Against Dualism. Philos Stud 130, 565–578 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-6426-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-6426-0

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