Skip to main content
Log in

Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism

  • Published:
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstact

The binary divide between traditional cognitivist and enactivist paradigms is tied to their respective commitments to understanding cognition as based on knowing that as opposed to knowing how. Using O'Regan's and Noë's landmark sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience as a foil, I demonstrate how easy it is to fall into conservative thinking. Although their account is advertised as decidedly ‘skill-based’, on close inspection it shows itself to be riddled with suppositions threatening to reduce it to a rules-and-representations approach. To remain properly enactivist it must be purged of such commitments and indeed all commitment to mediating knowledge: it must embrace a more radical enactivism

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Baker, L. R. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bermúdez, J. L. 2003. Thinking Without Words. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. 1991. Consciousness Explained. New York: Penguin Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fodor, J. A. 1983. The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurley, S. L. 1998. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutto, D. D. 2000. Beyond Physicalism. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hutto, D. D. 2006. Unprincipled Engagements: Emotional Experience, Expression and Response. In: M. J. Rowlands and R. Menary (eds), Consciousness and Emotion: Special Issue on Radical Enactivism – Emotion, Intentionality and Phenomenology, (forthcoming).

  • Millikan, R. G. 2000. On Clear and Confused Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan, R. G. 2004. Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures. Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Myin, E. and O'Regan, J. K. 2002. A way to naturalize phenomenology? Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (1): 27–46.

    Google Scholar 

  • O‘Regan, J. K., Myin, E. and Noë, A. 2005. Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of ‘corporality’ and ‘alterting capacity’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, this issue.

  • O'Regan, J. K. and Noë, A. 2001. A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioural and Brain Sciences 24 (2001): 939–1031.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paquet, M. 2000. René Magritte 18981967: Thought Rendered Visible. Köln: Taschen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rowlands, M. J. 2005. Understanding the ‘Active’ in ‘Enactive’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, this issue.

  • Ryle, G. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.

    Google Scholar 

  • Varela, F. J., Thompson, E. and Rosch, E. 1991. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Daniel D. Hutto.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Hutto, D.D. Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism. Phenom Cogn Sci 4, 389–405 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9001-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-005-9001-z

Key words

Navigation