Abstract
Constrained coherence is compared to coherence and its role in the behavioural interpretation of coherence is discussed. The equivalence of these two notions is proven for coherent conditional previsions, showing that the same course of reasoning applies to several similar concepts developed in the realm of imprecise probability theory .
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Vicig, P. A Note on the Equivalence of Coherence and Constrained Coherence. Minds & Machines 26, 303–305 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-015-9387-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-015-9387-5