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‘By’

A refutation of the Anscombe Thesis

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Abstract

The paper has two main objectives: first, it presents a new argument against the so-called Anscombe Thesis (if x φ-s by ψ-ing, then x’s φ-ing = x’s ψ-ing). Second, it develops a proposal about the syntax and semantics of the ‘by’-locution.

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  1. Humboldt University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany

    Benjamin Schnieder

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  1. Benjamin Schnieder
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Correspondence to Benjamin Schnieder.

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Schnieder, B. ‘By’. Linguist and Philos 31, 649–669 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10988-009-9051-8

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