Retributivism In Extremis
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- Husak, D. Law and Philos (2013) 32: 3. doi:10.1007/s10982-012-9145-2
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I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples of self-defense he subsequently tries to apply to ordinary cases of punishment.