Abstract
I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples of self-defense he subsequently tries to apply to ordinary cases of punishment.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
I thank Kim Ferzan both for organizing the conference and for editing my manuscript.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Husak, D. Retributivism In Extremis . Law and Philos 32, 3–31 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-012-9145-2
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-012-9145-2