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Guy Fletcher, “Sentimental Value,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2009): 55–65; Anthony Hatzimoysis, “Sentimental Value,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 373–379.
G. E. Moore, ‘‘The Conception of Intrinsic Value,’’ in Thomas Baldwin, ed., Principia Ethica (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
Guy Fletcher, “On Hatizmoysis on Sentimental Value,” Philosophia 37 (2009): 149–152.
Anthony Hatzimoysis, “Sentimental Value,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003): 373–379.
Christine M. Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 169–195, p. 169.
Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” 180.
Korsgaard, “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” 190. That is to say that, “A conditionally valuable thing can still be fully justified, if the unconditioned condition of its goodness is met. Things that are not self-justifying can be justified by something else. In particular, ends whose condition is their desirability can be justified by the rational choices of human beings.”
I am grateful to the editors for helping to develop this point.
This formulation is parasitic on a common criticism of constructivism in ethics: that the procedure either requires external criteria or is endlessly circular. See: Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
This American Life, “The House Near Loon Lake,” Episode 199. Originally Aired 11.16.2001. http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/199/transcript.
Guy Fletcher, “On Sentimental Value,” 56; Hatizmoysis, 374.
For a full discussion of normative reasons see: Michael Woods, “Reasons for Action and Desire,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 46 (1972): 189–201. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, “A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For Its Own Sake,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2000): 33–51, p. 34.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 41.
The examples provided are often of historical significance—for instance, Princess Diana’s dress, Napoleon’s hat, and original works of art. In a way, the ‘importance’ is obvious as a matter of world-historical significance.
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 41.
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DuFord, R. An Expanded Conception of Sentimental Value. J Value Inquiry 51, 1–11 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9550-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-016-9550-0