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See L. Bovens, “Apologies” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108(3) (2008) 219–239 and N. Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008.) and N. Smith, “The Categorical Apology” The Journal of Social Philosophy 36(4) (2005) 473–469 and R. Joyce, “Apologizing” Public Affairs Quarterly 13(2) (1999) 159–173 and A. Lazare, On Apology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004) and G. Pettigrove and J Collins, “Apologising for Who I Am” Journal of Applied Philosophy 28(2) (2011) 137–150.
There is a large literature on past wrongs, and intergenerational wrongs, and the extent to which current generations can be held responsible, and ought to apologise for, such past wrongs. See for instance G. Schedler, “Should There be an Apology for American Slavery?” Should There Be an Apology for American Slavery? 21(2) (2007) 125–148 and T. Van Den Beld, “Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist Over Generations?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5(2) (2002) 181–200. There is also discussion regarding future wrongs and, more generally, what duties we owe to future persons. These discussions, however, are typically primarily concerned with currently non-existent future persons, some of whom might be such that their existence is contingent upon our current decisions. There has been little discussion of whether we can (or ought) to issue prospective apologies to such future persons whose lives we make worse by our current choices. See M. A. Robertsand, D. T. Wasserman, Harming Future Persons. (Springer Verlag 2009) and A. Wrigley, “Harm to Future Persons; Non-Identity Problems and Counterpart Solutions” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15(2) (2012) 175–190 for discussion of harm to future persons.
There is a clear parallel here with the forgiveness literature in which there is a dispute about whether forgiveness is entirely grounded in the psychological state of the forgiver, or whether the psychological state of the person being forgiven is also necessary for the act of forgiveness to be genuine, or, in some cases, for the act to count as an act of forgiveness at all. G. Pettigrove “Unapologetic Forgiveness” American Philosophical Quarterly 41(3) (2004) 187–204, contends that only narrow conditions matter to forgiveness: it is for instance, irrelevant whether the person being forgiven is truly sorry for their actions. This is in contrast to those who think that forgiveness amounts to removed no longer warranted resentment, and thus that in the absence of remorse on the other party, forgiveness is not warranted. See for instance C. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration. (CUP 2007).
These requirements are not always known by the names I have used here.
It is sometimes said that prediction crowds out deliberation. I. Levi, “The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory” Journal of Philosophy 97(7) (2000) 387–402.
H. Price “Against Causal Decision Theory” Synthese 67(2) (1986) 195–212; H. Price “Causal Perspectivalism” in Huw Price and Richard Corry (ed). Causation, Physics and the Constitution of Reality: Russell’s Republic Revisited. (OUP 2007).
We can imagine the infallible source as a mysterious oracle, or merely as someone who has access to future truths (if determinism is true, someone who can predict the future through knowledge of the relevant facts and the laws; or someone who has causal access to the future).
For more substantial discussions of the connections between guilt and remorse see M. Baron, “Remorse and Agent-Regret” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13(1) (1988) 259–281; C. Cordner, “Guilt, Remorse and Victims” Philosophical Investigation 30(4) (2007) 337–362 and R. Rosenthal, “Moral Weakness and Remorse” Mind 76(304) (1967) 576–579.
Where this includes access to facts about whether some action A is right or wrong, and access to facts about whether, if the action was wrong, the action was performed culpably.
Though in other circumstances it may be reasonable to believe that Y did perform A, given sufficient other grounds to justify the belief.
i.e. the act for which the apology is being made.
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Miller, K. Conditional and Prospective Apologies. J Value Inquiry 48, 403–417 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9426-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9426-0