, Volume 45, Issue 1, pp 37-48
Date: 23 Feb 2011

Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory

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Introduction

Some philosophers have recently developed hybrid meta-ethical theories by merging elements of both expressivism and cognitivism.

See Daniel Boisvert, “Expressive-Assertivism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 89, no. 2 (2008); see also David Copp, “Realist Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,” Social Philosophy and Policy, vol. 18, no. 2 (2001); Michael Ridge, “Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege,” Ethics vol. 116, no. 2 (2006); Ridge, “Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?” in Rush Shafer-Landau, ed., Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 2 (2007); Mark Schroeder, “Hybrid Expressivism: Virtues and Vices,” Ethics, vol. 119, no. 2 (2009).

Such hybrid theorists combine the expressivist thesis that moral utterances are neither true nor false, because they are used to express attitudes, with the cognitivist thesis that moral utterances are true or false, because they are used to express beliefs. Hybrid theories advanced so far in the literature ...