Abstract
This paper analyzes the following question: What do women deserve, ethically speaking, when they agree to gestate a fetus on behalf of third parties? I argue for several claims. First, I argue that gestational motherhood’s moral significance has been misunderstood, an oversight I attribute to the focus in family ethics on the conditions of parenthood. Second, I use a less controversial version of James Rachels’s account of desert to argue that gestational mothers deserve a parent-like voice as well as significant care and support, conclusions that have implications for commercial surrogacy. Finally, I argue that we should not make requests of others when fulfilling them will lead others to deserve goods we cannot reasonably expect them to receive, and I conclude based on this thesis, what I call the “strings attached thesis,” that pro-life arguments in support of prohibitions on abortion commit their proponents to policies which they may not be willing to support.
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Notes
By “gestational mother” I mean a woman who may or may not have a genetic relation to a fetus, and who may or may not have an intent to rear this fetus, but whose body is used to gestate and to give birth to the fetus.
My quotations from Kolers, Bayne, and Austin may need to be qualified. To be clear: these authors are not concerned to refute or to defend gestationalism. Each argues for a pluralistic account of parenthood, which holds that several types of relationships are sufficient for parenthood. I quote from them because their remarks provide a helpful snapshot of the secondary literature—why many find gestationalism problematic. Indeed, Kolers and Bayne consider that the parity principle may be compatible with gestationalism in “Toward a Pluralistic Account of Parenthood” (Kolers and Bayne 2001, 2003 225).
To my knowledge Rachels does not define the term effort. I would suggest, however, that it should be understood broadly—not just the amount of exertion expended toward a purpose but its physical and mental demandingness. A perfectionist in a public speaking course may put a lot of effort into an assignment by practicing it ad nauseam. But a person with social anxiety disorder may find the same assignment even more effortful, even though they spend less time rehearsing, because it requires them to overcome their anxiety.
For criticisms see Feldman 1995.
See the sample contact provided by allaboutsurrogacy.com at: http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/sample_contracts/TScontract1.htm
My proposal here parallels claims Margaret Urban Walker develops in “Truth and Voice in Women’s Rights,” where she discusses the role truth commissions play in securing a “right to voice” for women who have been oppressed. Walker presents truth commissions as political institutions which ensure, among other things, that women are recognized as authoritative tellers of the truth about their lives and experiences. I see guarantees of mediations in surrogacy contracts as a way to secure an analogous “right to voice,” one that commercial surrogates deserve based on the work they perform.
One might raise a question here about this argument’s implications for caregivers who conduct parent-like activities but are not often viewed as deserving parent-like recognition, such as in-home child care workers. I find it reasonable to think that there can be cases where these individuals, like surrogates, deserve parent-like recognition even though they do not possess parental rights. For example, grandparents who do the bulk of the work caring for a young child may have a greater claim to deserve parental recognition than, say, a negligent parent. Even though the negligent parent may possess parental rights, the grandparents may have a greater claim to deserve them, and the parent may, in turn, have an obligation to consult with the grandparents before making important decisions on behalf of the child. The same considerations would apply, I think, in cases where an in-home child care worker, such as nanny, fulfills this role—where they perform the majority of the labor involved in caring for a child.
See especially Harms et al. 2004. 415–504.
I hasten to add that this responsibility is prima facie. Other considerations can override it. For example, a nation may need to resort to conscription in a desperate phase of a military conflict even though its leaders cannot anticipate whether veterans will be adequately rewarded for their service. Or, in my example, if the professor had a strong personal interest in chairing the committee, it may be permissible for the dean to make his request since it promotes her autonomy. I simply claim that, all other things being equal, one should not require others to engage in effortful service if one has reasons to doubt that they will receive their just deserts.
See Thomson 1971 58–59.
I would emphasize that this argument applies only to cases where others require a woman to carry a fetus to term. It follows from SAT that third parties should provide gestational mothers with appropriate care if they would make this request. Such cases are different, however, from ones where a woman chooses to become a parent.
My analysis of gestational motherhood’s deserved goods may also have implications for paternal rights—whether mothers can have moral obligations to fathers to forgo abortions and whether fathers should have veto power over a mother’s decision to abort. Arguments for paternal rights often emphasize consent and autonomy in characterizing the moral relationship between fathers and mothers. For example, George Harris (1986) argues in “Fathers and Fetuses” that mothers have obligations to fathers to forgo abortions when pregnancies result from a reciprocal decision to use one another’s bodies to create life, hence a decision that leads to a reciprocal violation of autonomy when the fetus is harmed without mutual consent. My argument suggests that this characterization oversimplifies the moral relationship between fathers and mothers. There may be reciprocity in a father’s and a mother’s autonomous decision to become parents, but there is certainly not reciprocity in the effort they expend to realize it. This asymmetry may give mothers a claim to deserve greater moral standing in considerations over whether to carry a fetus to term. However, this is a controversial claim, one I do not have space to compellingly defend in this paper.
References
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Melissa Seymour Fahmy and a pair of anonymous referres from Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. This paper was greatly improved thanks to their comments and suggestions.
