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Respectful Lying

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Abstract

I argue that there are instances in which lying to an innocent and generally competent person respects her autonomy, contrary to arguments by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. These authors say that respect for a person’s autonomy requires treating her in a way consistent with the possibility of consent, but I contend that the possibility of consent condition is unworkable. I maintain that lying can respect individual autonomy when being truthful to a person undermines her choices and lying gets her what she would reasonably see herself as having most reason to choose in the circumstances. I make my case by reflecting on lying invitations to a surprise party and on negotiation phenomena.

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Notes

  1. I rely on the assumption that one cannot consent to something unless one has good reason to think it possible. The assumption strikes me as plausible because in order to consent to something, one must have a clear idea about that to which one consents, and one cannot form a clear idea of the impossible. Hence one cannot consent to receive a round square.

  2. I thank an anonymous referee for this point.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 600 Jon M. Huntsman Hall, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA

    Alan Strudler

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  1. Alan Strudler
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Correspondence to Alan Strudler.

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Strudler, A. Respectful Lying. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 19, 961–972 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9691-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9691-z

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