Abstract
That there could be ontologically complex concrete particulars is self-evidently true. A reductio may however be formulated which contradicts this truth. In this paper I argue that all of the reasonable ways in which we might refute this reductio will require the existence of at least some tropes.
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Notes
Our notion of a concrete particular may appear especially resistant to analysis. In our non-philosopher capacity we tend to think of all sorts of entities as belonging to this category. When wearing our philosopher’s hat we find it hard (perhaps impossible) to come up with a list of necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘thing-hood’ fit for all of those entities. For present purposes, it is enough if we require that concrete particulars occupy at most one position in space at each moment in time; that they have what we may call a ‘nature’ and, finally; that they are capable of surviving qualitative change. This, I believe, is prima facie acceptable to everyone (pending a deeper analysis of what the above entails in terms of ontological commitments). For a nice discussion of our notion of a concrete particular (as well as a first introduction to our friend Sam) see Loux (1998).
It is a ‘Moorean fact’. Cf. Moore (1959).
Read ‘proposition’ as short for the truthbearer of your choice.
As the relevant propositions are (positive) singular existential propositions of the form <a exists>, this assumption should be acceptable to the great majority of truthmaker theorists, whether they be critics of so-called truthmaker maximalism or not. For more on truthmaker theory, cf. e.g. Simons (1992), Armstrong (2004), Beebee and Dodd (2005), Cameron (2008).
As much follows from so-called truthmaker necessitarianism (TN); the assumption that the existence of a truthmaker necessitates the truth of some particular proposition (□((TM(p) exists) → p). Whether or not we should accept (TN) has been hotly debated. It is at least an open question (the answer to which I believe depends upon what stand one takes on the issue of the individuation of truthmakers) if my assumption not only follows from, but also requires, the truth of (TN). For a discussion of (TN), cf. Cameron (2005).
What is assumed is not just that concrete particulars have or could have parts but more specifically that they are entities with ontological constituents. Constituents, moreover, understood as the sort of things that do not behave exactly as do the ordinary concrete parts of concrete particulars. Armstrong (1997) talks of constitution explicitly as a “nonmereological mode of composition”.
In view of what I believe are convincing objections against the idea that concrete particulars are bundles of universals, this alternative will be disregarded in what follows (for arguments both for and against this contention, cf. Zimmerman (1997)). As the view that concrete particulars are substrates instantiating tropes involves (I believe, unnecessarily) the existence of mysterious substrates, it will be likewise ignored (cf. Maurin 2002: chapter 6). Nothing in my argument depends on these restrictions (other than the ease with which I can represent the different alternatives) and the reader is free to disregard them. With the restrictions in place, we are left with two ways of conceiving of Sam; as a bundle of his tropes or as a substrate instantiating his universal properties.
This argument is very much inspired by a famous passage in F. H. Bradley’s Appearance and Reality (1908: 17–23). In my interpretation, the argument retains its overall structure, but differs from the original in a number of other ways. Whether it differs from the original to the extent that it is in fact no longer a (contemporarily phrased) version of Bradley’s argument is a question I will not address in this paper. So as not to cause confusion on this issue, I will henceforth refer to the argument presented and discussed in this paper as a ‘Bradleyan’ and not as ‘Bradley’s’ argument.
To say of Sam that he is something more than the mere aggregate of his constituents is not, in other words, compatible with saying that he is something completely distinct from his constituents. To say this would be to deny what we here assume to be true, namely that Sam is ontologically complex.
But why could we not say that Sam’s constituents being a certain way is what makes Sam exist yet accept that Sam’s constituents being a certain other way could exist without Sam thereby existing? First, because that would require Sam’s constituents (properties, substrate) not just to have a nature, but to have a nature that might change. This seems odd. Second, and more importantly, if we want to say that it is the internal nature of the constituents that makes the difference between a world in which Sam exists and one in which he doesn’t we must be able to account for this difference philosophically (not just say that it exists). But this means that a Bradleyan argument analogous to the one presented above could be reproduced on the level of the internal nature of Sam’s constituents. With analogous, and likewise disastrous, results.
Just as Sam’s constituents might exist and not constitute Sam, our relation might exist and not relate Sam’s constituents (but rather relate some other entities so as to make up some concrete particular distinct from Sam).
For a more thorough discussion of the distinction between vicious and benign regresses, cf. Maurin (2007).
According to Armstrong (1980: 441), a ‘Moorean question’ is one that must be given a (substantial) answer. A ‘Moorean task’ is then a task that must be performed and brought to its successful conclusion if our theory is to be deemed acceptable.
Subscripts indicate that what is being referred to is particular (whether a trope (red1) or a substrate (substrate1)). Capitals indicate that it is universal (Redness). ‘Compresence’ is, as far as I know, the most common term used to refer to the relation that binds the constituents of a bundle together. Likewise, ‘instantiation’ (as well as its converse ‘exemplification’) is the most common term for the relation that holds between universals and substrate. Nothing depends on our choice of words here—feel free to substitute ‘compresent’ and ‘instantiated’ with the more neutral ‘relation’ and ‘related’.
I assume here that Sam is nothing but whatever is mentioned in B, which means that the truth of B is equivalent to the truth of <Sam exists>.
Just as we are barred from saying that he is nothing but the collection of his constituents+, where the extra something (the ‘+’) is internal to these constituents.
This is something we will have to accept whether or not we reject distinction (cf. Section 8 below).
Close, because there might be a way in which to reject distinction that is acceptable after all (cf. section 8 below).
If concrete particulars are bundles of universals (which is a problematic view to begin with) a case could be made for saying that the relation which ties such bundles together may exist in more than one place at one moment in time. However, this can hardly be said to make the universal-bundle view any more attractive; quite the opposite. Thus understood, we are now barred from saying that, although identically constituted, two indiscernible concrete particulars could still be distinguished by their being distinct ‘bundlings’.
This is what Armstrong calls the “victory of particularity” (1978a: 115).
They do not monopolize their position in space-time; we cannot pick them up and move them around; and so forth.
Considerations of ontological economy speak strongly against this.
That multiple realizability is normally taken as the universal’s defining characteristic is easily demonstrated. According to the Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy: “To say that properties are universals is to say that the selfsame property can be instantiated by numerically distinct things”. In his introduction to Metaphysics (1998: 23), M. J. Loux explains that: “Universals…are construed as repeatable entities. At any given time, numerically one and the same universal can be wholly and completely exhibited or, as realists typically put it, exemplified by, several different spatially discontinuous particulars”. Examples could be multiplied.
This intuition comes in both a weaker, temporal, and a stronger, modal, version. As stated above, it is of the modal kind. Put in temporal terms, it is the intuition that Sam could change yet not (thereby) cease to exist.
Provided, in the modal case, that we accept the thesis of the necessity of identity.
Notice that identity must be literally rejected irrespective of what we take Sam’s constituents to be (irrespective, that is, of whether we are bundle-theorists or substrate-universal theorists). In his (2006: 241), Armstrong argues against this contention and claims that: “It is not quite so obvious that subject/attribute analyses of particulars must yield the necessity of predication [i.e. must reject identity]. This is because a subject/attribute analysis creates a certain ‘distance’ between a particular and its properties, a distance not present in bundle theories /…/ given a subject/attribute analysis, the subject, the particular, seems to stand in some way or degree outside its properties.” It is clear from this quote, however, that the only way in which a subject/attribute theorist may avoid giving up identity is if she is willing to identify the concrete particular with the substrate only. But then identity is saved at the expense of a whole host of other, just as respectable, intuitions.
Cf. Chisholm (1976).
Which would be very bad indeed if you, as does Armstrong, think that the fact that the universal realist, but not the trope theorist, can do without a primitive notion of resemblance is what counts most strongly in favour of universal realism (Cf. Armstrong 1997).
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Acknowledgments
A very different version of this paper was presented in Nottingham at the 2008 conference Themes in the Metaphysics of D. M. Armstrong. I would like to thank the audience at that conference (especially David Armstrong) for good comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank Johan Brännmark as well as two anonymous referees from this journal for their extremely helpful comments. This research was partly funded by The Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, as part of the research project Ontological Justification: From Appearance to Reality.
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Maurin, AS. An Argument for the Existence of Tropes. Erkenn 74, 69–79 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9252-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-010-9252-0