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Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory

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Abstract

This paper argues against evidential decision-theory, by showing that the newest responses to its biggest current problem – the medical Newcomb problems – don’t work. The latest approach is described, and the arguments of two main proponents of it – Huw Price and CR Hitchcock – clearly distinguished and examined. It is argued that since neither new defence is successful, causation remains essential to understanding means-end agency.

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Acknowledgements

I am indebted to many colleagues at both Bristol and Stirling for helpful comments and suggestions on this work. In particular I would like to thank Helen Beebee, Alexander Bird, Dorothy Edgington, Hannes Leitgeb, Samir Okasha, David Papineau, and two anonymous referees for comments leading to substantial improvements to the paper.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Road, Bristol, BS8 1TB, UK

    Phyllis Kirstin McKay

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  1. Phyllis Kirstin McKay
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Correspondence to Phyllis Kirstin McKay.

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McKay, P.K. Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory. Erkenntnis 66, 393–407 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-007-9040-7

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