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Causal Compatibilism – What Chance?

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Abstract

Orthodox physicalism has a problem with mental causation. If physics is complete and mental events are not identical to physical events (as multiple-realisation arguments imply) it seems as though there is no causal work for the mental to do. This paper examines some recent attempts to overcome this problem by analysing causation in terms of counterfactuals or conditional probabilities. It is argued that these solutions cannot simultaneously capture the force of the completeness of physics and make room for mental causation.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Newman Building, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland

    Jack Ritchie

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  1. Jack Ritchie
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Correspondence to Jack Ritchie.

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Ritchie, J. Causal Compatibilism – What Chance?. Erkenntnis 63, 119–132 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-3056-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-005-3056-7

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