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Extending the Non-extendible: Shades of Infinity in Large Cardinals and Forcing Theories

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Abstract

This is an article whose intended scope is to deal with the question of infinity in formal mathematics, mainly in the context of the theory of large cardinals as it has developed over time since Cantor’s introduction of the theory of transfinite numbers in the late nineteenth century. A special focus has been given to this theory’s interrelation with the forcing theory, introduced by P. Cohen in his lectures of 1963 and further extended and deepened since then, which leads to a development and further refinement of the theory of large cardinals ultimately touching, especially in view of the discussion in the last section, on the metatheoretical nature of infinity. The whole undertaking, which takes into account major stages of the research in large cardinals theory, tries to present a defensible argumentation against an ontology of infinity actually rooted in the notion of subjectivity within the world. This means that rather than talking of a general ontology of infinity in the ideal platonic or in the aristotelian sense of potentiality, even in the alternative sense of an ontology of the event in A. Badiou’s sense, one can argue from a subjective point of view about the impossibility of defining cardinalities greater than the first uncountable one \(\aleph _{1}\) that would correspond to a distinct existence in real world terms or would be supported by a mathematical intuition in terms of reciprocity with experience. The argumentation from the particular standpoint includes also certain comments on the delimitative character of Gödel’s constructive universe L and the influence of the constructive approach in narrowing the breadth of an ‘ontology’ of infinity.

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Notes

  1. The term immanent, widely used in Husserlian and generally phenomenological texts, can be roughly explained as referring to what is or has become correlative (or ‘co-substantial’) to the being of the flux of one’s consciousness in contrast to what is ‘external’ or transcendental to it. For instance, a tree is transcendental as such to the consciousness of an ‘observer’ while its appearance in the modes of its appearing within his consciousness is immanent to it.

  2. For structures \(\mathcal {M}_{0}=<M_{0},\ldots>\) and \(\mathcal {M}_{1}=<M_{1},\ldots>\) of a language \(\mathcal {L}\), an injective function \(j:M_{0}\longrightarrow M_{1}\) is an elementary embedding of \(\mathcal {M}_{0}\) into \(\mathcal {M}_{1}\) (\(j:\mathcal {M}_{0}\prec \mathcal {M}_{1}\)) iff for any formula \(\varphi (u_{1},\ldots ,u_{n})\) of \(\mathcal {L}\) and \(x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n}\in M_{0}\)

    $$\begin{aligned} \mathcal {M}_{0}\models \varphi [x_{1},\ldots ,x_{n}]\;\;\text{ iff }\;\; \mathcal {M}_{1}\models \varphi [j(x_{1}),\ldots ,j(x_{n})]. \end{aligned}$$
  3. A class M is an inner model iff M is a transitive model of ZF under the \(\in\) predicate and contains the class of all ordinals, i.e., \(ON\subseteq M\).

  4. There are mathematical notions and definitions in the text for which it would be cumbersome and inconvenient to add an explanatory footnote for each one of them. The interested reader can consult accordingly A. Kanamori’s The Higher Infinite and K. Kunen’s Set Theory. An Introduction to Independence Proofs, resp. (Kanamori 2009; Kunen 1982). For a given set A the constructive closure L(A) is defined in Kanamori (2009, p. 34).

  5. Two key positions of R. Tieszen’s constituted platonism, a sort of blend of phenomenological analysis with platonic idealist positions refer to: (a) the a priori directedness of intentionality associated not only with sensory objects but also with immanent ones (temporal in nature and generated by ‘inner’ mental processes) and even ideal ones, that is, non-spatial and ‘atemporal’ objects such as numbers, elements of sets, aggregation of elements, etc. (b) the characterization of mathematical-logical objects as mind-dependent\(_{1}\) and mind-independent\(_{2}\) (where mind-independence\(_{2}\) falls under mind-dependence\(_{1}\)), in the sense that they are intentional objects not constrained by material and causal preoccupations and yet not arbitrary ideal ‘counterparts’ of appearances in consciousness or pure constructs of imagination (Tieszen 2011, p. 115). This schematic classification is in fact founded on Tieszen’s phenomenologically rooted view of mathematical-logical objects as taking their whole sense of being from a subject’s intentionality within the world at large.

  6. Hauser’s and Woodin’s positions (Hauser and Woodin 2014) can be summed up as proposing in favor of mathematical realism examples in which strong axioms of infinity are demonstrably incomparable thus refuting the anti-realist thesis that the convergence of methods toward higher infinity is a mere artefact of set-theoretical language.

  7. The term metatheoretical used in this text, in a wider and deeper sense than the one referring to a (formal) theory from the ‘outside’, points to an ultimately subjective foundation.

  8. By an eidetic law in the world of phenomena one can roughly communicate to a non-phenomenologist what is implied by essential necessity and not by mere facticity. The interested reader may consult Husserl’s Ideas I (Husserl 1976, Engl. transl., pp. 12–15).

  9. A cardinal \(\kappa\) is weakly inaccessible iff \(\kappa\) is a regular limit cardinal and it is strongly inaccessible iff \(\kappa > \omega\), \(\kappa\) is regular and \(\forall \lambda< \kappa \;(2^{\lambda }< \kappa )\).

  10. In the cumulative hierarchy the submodel \(V_{\kappa }\) is defined to be the collection of all sets whose von Neumann rank is less than \(\kappa\) and is a model of ZFC. The constructive class \(L_{\kappa }\) is the class recursively defined for the ordinal \(\kappa\) within Gödel’s constructive universe L; see for details: Kunen (1982, pp. 166–167).

  11. It is interesting to note in connection with the independence of the existence of inaccessible cardinals, that the ‘conventional’ axiom of infinity in ZFC theory has the notable characteristic that its truth implies its independence of the other axioms essentially due to the fact that the infinite set of hereditarily finite sets forms a model of the other axioms in which there is no infinite set. Therefore as the assertion of the truthfulness of the infinity axiom implies its independence we are forced to introduce it as a new axiom and moreover one should expect that the postulation of existence of ever larger cardinals to have this character, as it indeed has Solovay et al. (1978, p. 73).

  12. A major concept of large cardinals theory, associated with a generalization of Lebesgue’s measure, is that of measurable cardinals whose definition is this: For a cardinal \(\kappa > \omega\), \(\kappa\) is measurable iff there is a \(\kappa\)-complete (non-principal) ultrafilter over \(\kappa\) (Kanamori 2009, p. 26).

  13. As a matter of fact this particular question is left unanswered by adding to the ZF axioms the large cardinal axiom of existence of a measurable cardinal (Lèvy and Solovay 1967, p. 1). In another paper Jensen has proved by forcing techniques that GCH (Generalized Continuum Hypothesis) is consistent with the existence of large cardinals, in particular with the existence of measurable and Ramsey cardinals (Jensen 1974, pp. 175–177).

  14. A cardinal \(\kappa > \omega\) is defined as supercompact iff for all ordinals \(\lambda \ge \kappa\) there is an elementary embedding \(j:V\longrightarrow M\) with critical point \(\kappa\) (i.e. the least ordinal ‘moved’ by j) and \(\lambda < j(\kappa )\) such that any sequence of elements from M with length \(\lambda\) belongs to M.

  15. The ultrapower \(\text{ Ult }(V,U)\) is constructed as a quotient space on the basis of a \(\kappa\)-complete ultrafilter U over the set-theoretical universe V which is subsequently transformed into an inner model M by Mostowski’s transitive collapse.

  16. The collapsing of cardinals is an ingenious forcing technique primarily founded on the notions of genericity and absoluteness. Thus an uncountable cardinal in a base model M can be made to collapse to a countable cardinal in the forcing model M[G] thanks to the generic property of an onto function \(\bigcup G\) over M[G], where G is a P-generic set over a partially ordered set P in M (in this case the poset P can be the set of finite functions from the infinite countable cardinal \(\omega\) to an uncountable cardinal \(\kappa\)). The Levy collapse is a generalization of the technique involving a regular cardinal \(\kappa\) and a cardinal \(\lambda > \kappa\) which can be made to collapse to \(\kappa\) in the generic extension. For details, see Kunen (1982, p. 205) and Jech (2006, p. 237).

  17. For a discussion of the metatheoretical foundations of forcing theory the reader may look into Livadas (2015).

  18. The term intentional is taken in its phenomenological connotation, that is, roughly as meaning the a priori tendency of consciousness toward something-in-general independently of a causality and spatio-temporality context and also independently of the object’s material or general ‘thingness’ content.

  19. A further description of this kind of immanent infinity free of spatio-temporal and, for that matter, causal constraints can be found in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. At some point Husserl cautioned that the free extension of space and time stretches in imagination is not really a proof of the relative ‘foundedness’ of bits of space and time and therefore does not prove the real infinity of space and time which is anyway subject to the natural laws of causality (see: Husserl 1984, pp. 299–300). This kind of actual infinity freely generated in terms of the continuous unity of temporal consciousness is presented as an objective whole in acts of reflection in the actual now.

  20. Concerning Woodin’s ongoing research in deep foundational questions and the quest for what has been called the Ultimate L-Conjecture (V = Ultimate-L), I note the difficulties encountered, in his own words, in the construction of a weak extender model witnessing the Ultimate L-conjecture which validates also consistency claims beyond the level of one supercompact cardinal (see Woodin 2017).

  21. For instance, a cardinal \(\kappa\) is defined as measurable through the existence of a non-principal, \(\kappa\)-complete ultrafilter over \(\kappa\), which is considered as a statement of existence and not a procedure of inaccessibility, e.g., by means of closedness under the taking of the power-set of all smaller cardinals.

  22. A noematic object, a phenomenological term, is said to be constituted by certain modes as a well-defined object immanent to the temporal flux of a subject’s consciousness. It can then be said to be given apodictically in experience inasmuch as: (1) it can be recognized by a perceiver directly as a manifested essence in any perceptual judgement (2) it can be predicated as existing according to the descriptive norms of a language and (3) it can be verified as such (as a reidentifying object) in multiple acts more or less at will. More in Husserl’s Ideas I Husserl (1976, Engl. transl., pp. 240–243).

  23. Think, for instance, of a sequence of natural numbers or of elements of any other isomorphic structure as associated with intentional acts of a consciousness performed in a perfectly distinct and finitistic mode (called the two-ity intuition in Van Atten et al. 2002, pp. 206–208). These are not conceivable but as performed in an ideally infinite iterative fashion against the background continuous unity of the immanence of consciousness.

  24. A cpo is defined to be a dcpo with a least element. A dcpo, in turn, is a partially ordered set in which every directed subset has a least upper bound. Most technical definitions in this section are not deemed as absolutely necessary to comprehend the intended argument, therefore they may be skipped. In any case one may look for relevant stuff in Smyth (1992) and Porter and Woods (1988, Ch. 3).

  25. A subset O of a dcpo X is taken as open in the Scott topology of X if:

    1. (i)

      \(x\in O\;\text{ then }\;\uparrow x\in O\)

    2. (ii)

      \(\sqcup _{\uparrow }S \in O\;\Rightarrow S\cap O\ne \emptyset\) where \(\sqcup _{\uparrow }S\) is the least upper bound of a directed subset S; for details, see Smyth (1992), pp. 642–650.

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Appendix I: The Notion of Actual Infinity as a Precondition for the Separability of Space Points

Appendix I: The Notion of Actual Infinity as a Precondition for the Separability of Space Points

To strengthen my arguments about formal infinity taken as the abstract form of a subjectively founded continuous unity, I present the example (which may be skipped by the mathematically uninterested reader) of a special topology in which the uncountability and separability of the points of the corresponding topological space is not by essence associated with infinity in objective real world terms. To formally ground my claim I will be based on a well-known mathematical space proved to be homeomorphic to the set of irrational numbers, this latter set provided with the subspace topology inherited from the standard Euclidean topology of the real line. The space in question, the Baire space \(N^{\omega }\), is taken to be the set of maximal elements of the cpoFootnote 24 of finite and infinite sequences of natural numbers equipped with the subspace topology of the Scott topology.Footnote 25 This topology has as a base the collection of sets of the form \(\uparrow s\cap N^{\omega }\), where by \(\uparrow s\) is denoted the upper set of the finite sequence of digits s, that is, \(\uparrow s= \{\xi ;\; s\le \xi \}\) where the order relation \(\le\) is defined by: \(\xi \le \xi ^{'}\) iff \(\xi ^{'}\) extends \(\xi\) (or \(\xi\) is a prefix of \(\xi ^{'}\)); that is, \(\xi ^{'}\) starts with exactly the same digits as \(\xi\) and possibly has infinitely more. Usually this partial order is called in the mathematical literature a prefix ordering and is the key to the definition of several order-induced topologies of computational interest.

The interesting thing about the space \(N^{\omega }\) as a Scott space is that it can be turned into a Stone space by taking as basic open sets except for the basic Scott opens of the form \(\uparrow s\) (s finite) also their complements \(N^{\omega }\setminus \uparrow s\). Generally it is proved that in this refined topology the base \(\mathcal {B}\) of the clopen sets as above is a sub-Boolean algebra of the power-set of the original space \(N^{\omega }\) and that every ultrafilter of \(\mathcal {B}\) is a \(\mathcal {B}\)-neighborhood filter \(\mathcal {N}_{B}(x)\) for a unique point x of \(N^{\omega }\), where \(\mathcal {N}_{B}(x)\) is the set \(\{U\in \mathcal {B};\;x\in U\}\) (Smyth 1992, pp. 734–735). Moreover, by Stone’s representation theorem one has that the Stone space \(N^{\omega }\) is a Hausdorff, compact, zero-dimensional and totally disconnected space (Porter and Woods 1988, pp. 171–172). What is of a special importance here, given my intention, is the Hausdorff property of \(N^{\omega }\), namely the fact that for any two distinct points x, y of \(N^{\omega }\) (which are actually infinite sequences of natural numbers) it can be proved that there are neighborhoods \(U_{x}\) and \(Y_{y}\) belonging respectively to the \(\mathcal {B}\)-neighborhood filters \(\mathcal {N}_{B}(x)\) and \(\mathcal {N}_{B}(y)\) such that: \(U_{x}\cap Y_{y}=\emptyset\).

This means that the way to separate any two distinct points x, y of \(N^{\omega }\) (which as homeomorphic to the space of irrational reals is a space of uncountable cardinality), is by generating at least two disjoint open neighborhoods of them. Further and to the extent that the points of \(N^{\omega }\) can be thought of as corresponding to infinite decimal expansions of irrationals, it follows that however close any two distinct points can be in terms of proximity of their decimal expansion they can still be separated by disjoint open sets. Put more intuitively, the possibility of discerning between any two points of \(N^{\omega }\) regardless of their proximity ad infinitum is conditioned on the formation of two disjoint neighborhoods to which they respectively belong, these latter ones meant as non-finite (by virtue of their topological openness) yet definite wholes in presentational immediacy. Essentially, the possibility for distinguishing space points in the form of infinitely extending sequences of natural numbers (or of binary digits) ordered by prefixing is ultimately conditioned on the possibility of forming at once their disjoint neighborhoods as definite continuous wholes in the present now of consciousness. In turn, completed wholes as actual ‘infinities’ freely generated in reflection independently of any spatio-temporal and causal concerns point to a concept of infinity constituted as the objective form of the continuous unity of each one’s temporal consciousness.

Consequently there is a case to be made here for the fact that, in shifting the focus of discussion to a fundamental constitutional level, the notion of continuity as such is not necessarily connected with the mathematical notion of uncountability. In fact, conventional uncountability is underdetermined with regard to its subjective origin in all classical proofs (e.g., think of Cantor’s diagonal proof of the uncountability of real numbers) to the extent that it is circularly conditioned on a pre-existing notion of ‘infinity’ in the sense of a subjectively generated and completed totality non-eliminable within a formal logical-mathematical universe.

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Livadas, S. Extending the Non-extendible: Shades of Infinity in Large Cardinals and Forcing Theories. Axiomathes 28, 565–586 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9387-1

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