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Idiolects and Language

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Abstract

The present paper is intended to analyse from a theoretical point of view the relationships between natural language and idiolects in the context of communication by means of the Davidson–Dummett controversy on the nature of language. I will explore from a pragmatic point of view the reliability of an alternative position inspired by the recent literalism/contextualism debate in philosophy of language in order to overcome some limitations of Dummett’s and Davidson’s perspectives on language, idiolects and communication.

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Notes

  1. For the distinction between modest theories and full-blooded theories (see: Dummett 1974, p. 102).

  2. Note that “modest theory” does not stand for a theory with limited goals, i.e. a modest theory can achieve ambitious results, too. What is “modest” is the methodology, not the aims. A vivid example of a modest theory is the one presented in Davidson (1967), while the most recent works of Davidson do not fit anymore in a modest program, because of the role that charity and triangulation play in Davidson’s theory of meaning and communication. See Gaifmann (1996).

  3. Note that not all possible combinations of the questions I and II make sense and therefore the two main questions are not completely separated. For instance, if one assumes that there is no shared language in communication, then one cannot maintain that the shared language is prior to the idiolects.

  4. Dummett (1986).

  5. Karen Green also manifests some perplexities for the identification of Dummett’s pair “short range theory” and “long-range theory” with Davidson’s pair “prior theory” and “passing theory”. Cf. Green (2001).

  6. The problem of the linguistic creativity can be addressed with different approaches, e.g., the lexical productivity, the recursiveness, and the assignment of new uses of previous words (such as metaphors and some kinds of idiolects). As noted in Groenendijk and Stokhof (2005), these three approaches to linguistic creativity do not stand only for three different views about the same phenomenon, viz. every theory supports a different ontology. This implies that we need to use our conceptual tools “as if” the given underlying our linguistic theory should be exactly the one that fits better in our pre-established approach.

  7. Cf. Dummett (1986).

  8. See Dummett (1989). Usually, one cannot easily make a distinction between the aspects regarding our language and the ones regarding our thoughts. But when something goes wrong one can become aware of the interplay between language and thought. See Wittgenstein (1953, §330).

  9. We know that the conversational implicatures explain the pragmatic and intuitive part of meaning that cannot be handled by the standard truth-conditional semantics. Dummett’s distinction between a first-order theory and a second-order theory can be handled by Grice’s theory of conversational implicatures. But according to Grice, the speaker’s meaning is based on the communicative intentions of the speaker, while, for Dummett, intentionality does play a secondary role in the theory of meaning. Nevertheless, also Dummett argues that part of our understanding is implicit, and a theory of meaning should make it explicit. In any case, he does not maintain that some unintentional linguistic phenomena (like malapropisms) can play any role in the theory of meaning.

    Two different types of conversational implicatures are usually isolated: the generalized conversational implicatures (which are inferable without a strong appeal to a particular context) and the particularized conversational implicatures (which are mainly contextual). Namely, the first order theory is what Grice calls “what is said” (the descriptive meaning or the truth-conditional one), while the second-order theory is a generalized conversational implicature. Therefore, the generalized conversational implicatures are an important interface between purely semantic and pragmatic aspects. See Grice (1975) and Levinson (2000).

    Another important class of non-truth-conditional aspects of the natural language is determined by means of the conventional implicatures, which are based on the conventional meaning of the words. Karttunen and Peters (1979) suggested to formalize the conventional implicatures by means of two formulae. The first formula expresses the literal (truth-conditional) meaning of a sentence, while the second its conventional implicature. In this way it is even possible to formalize in a recursive manner the non-truth-conditional aspects of language. See Gamut (1991, chapter VI).

  10. Cf. Dummett (1986).

  11. See Wittgenstein (1953, §202).

  12. Dummett (1973).

  13. This is Dummett’s point of view. See Penco (2007). Davidson could solve this problem with his theory of radical interpretation, which starts “from scratch”, without any appeal to any common knowledge between speaker and interpreter.

  14. Cf. Penco (2007).

  15. For further details, see Hintikka (1987).

  16. See the example in Wittgenstein (1953, §200).

  17. Cf. Quine (1960).

  18. An indexical expression can be classically viewed as an open sentence, namely the interpretation of a sentence containing indexical is a function from contexts to propositions, while a proposition is a function from possible worlds to truth values. See Stalnaker (1970).

  19. If one holds a strong view about the concept of “idiolect”, then there is no possibility that two different idiolects can belong to the same shared language. That is not the case if the concept of idiolect involved is understood as a partial grasp of a language, or an implicature.

  20. Nevertheless, a third idiolect overlapping the other two idiolects can work like a partial interpreter allowing a process of indirect communication.

  21. See Lewis (1969).

  22. Note that not all the problems of coordination can be solved referring to conventions. Imagine a situation where there are two individuals. We promise them that they can get a great sum of money if they choose the same number, but they cannot communicate with each other. In the 40% of the cases, the two individuals choose the number 1 (see Schelling 1960). Of course, this choice does not depend on the rationality of the individuals, but it depends on aesthetic, accidental, or social issues (known as focal points) which can offer reasons for simple collective choices. If a focal point becomes common knowledge, namely the probability of choosing the number 1 becomes close to 1, this fact can suffice to convert a focal point into a convention.

  23. Davidson (2004).

  24. Dummett (1994).

  25. Note that the use of conventions is rejected by Davidson. Hence, in my approach to the problem of the priority between idiolects and language the target is Davidsonian, not the methodology.

  26. See Strawson (1959), from p. 202.

  27. In Searle (2006) it is argued that the “feature placing” expressions are a sort of very primitive language common both to humans and to animals.

  28. See Lycan (2000). Of course, there can exist some linguistic systems which provide both aspects of pragmatics, but this does not suffice to eliminate the dichotomy.

  29. Dalla Pozza and Garola (1995) is a vivid example of the “pragmatic-pragmatics” tendency.

  30. See Levinson (2000).

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Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Martin Stokhof, Carlo Dalla Pozza, Carlo Penco and Davide Sergio for critical comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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  1. Department of Social Sciences and Communication, University of Salento (Lecce), via dei Salesiani, 25, 73100, Lecce, Italy

    Daniele Chiffi

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Chiffi, D. Idiolects and Language. Axiomathes 22, 417–432 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-011-9151-2

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