Skip to main content
Log in

Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model

  • Published:
Social Choice and Welfare Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract.

McKelvey [4] proved that for strong simple preference aggregation rules applied to multidimensional sets of alternatives, the typical situation is that either the core is nonempty or the top-cycle set includes all available alternatives. But the requirement that the rule be strong excludes, inter alia, all supermajority rules. In this note, we show that McKelvey's theorem further implies that the typical situation for any simple rule is that either the core is nonempty or the weak top-cycle set (equivalently, the core of the transitive closure of the rule) includes all available alternatives. Moreover, it is often the case that both of these statements obtain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received: 13 October 1997/Accepted: 24 August 1998

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Austen-Smith, D., Banks, J. Cycling of simple rules in the spatial model. Soc Choice Welfare 16, 663–672 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050167

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050167

Keywords

Navigation