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Reducible equilibrium properties: comments on recent existence results

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Abstract

We show that each of the properties of equilibrium problems considered in several recent Nash equilibrium existence results satisfy the following condition: All the existence problems that satisfy the property on a compact subset \(K\) of a fixed strategy space have, on \(K\), an equilibrium set that contains the equilibrium set of an existence problem that is well behaved on \(K\). The properties that satisfy this condition are called reducible equilibrium properties. This notion is used to clarify recent existence results and the relationship of some of the properties considered in those results.

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Notes

  1. The definition we use is more general in that we consider also normal-form games in which players’ preferences are described by complete preorders. For such games, the notion of a target function needs to adjusted.

  2. An important special case is that of a Nash equilibrium problem where each player’s target function is his value function.

  3. For example, we can define continuity as the property that associates with each subset of the strategy space the set of Nash equilibrium problems whose payoff functions are continuous at every point of that subset.

  4. Other recent papers on existence of equilibrium in discontinuous games, not explicitly considered in this paper, include Bagh and Jofre (2006), Monteiro and Page (2007), Bich (2009), Bagh (2010), Carbonell-Nicolau (2010), Tian (2010), Balder (2011), Castro (2011), Prokopovych (2011), Reny (2011), Prokopovych (2013), Prokopovych and Yannelis (2014), He and Yannelis (2014) and He and Yannelis (2014). This literature has been recently surveyed in Carmona (2013).

  5. Such a characterization based on the idea of reducing an equilibrium problem to a well-behaved one can be obtained. See footnote 6 for details.

  6. Another trivial answer to the above questions can be given using the argument in the proof of Remark 4 below. In fact, it can be used to show that, for each \(g\in \mathbb {G}\), \(E(g)\ne \emptyset \) if and only if \(g\in R_W(E(g)^c)\).

  7. The function \(\mathrm {proj}_{-0}:Z\rightarrow \prod \nolimits _{i=1}^nZ_i\) is defined by setting, for all \(z=(z_0,z_1,\ldots ,z_n)\in Z\), \(\mathrm {proj}_{-0}(z)=(z_1,\ldots ,z_n)\).

  8. Although reducible security does not explicitly require that \(v_{w_i}(y')\ge w_i(x')+\varepsilon \) for all \(y'\in U\), this property is satisfied because, since \(w_i\) is generalized payoff secure, \(v_{w_i}\) is lower semi-continuous.

  9. More generally, we say that \(G\) is continuously reducible secure on \(Y\subseteq X\) if \(G\) is reducible secure relative to a continuous \(w:X\rightarrow \mathbb {R}^n\) such that \(B_{G_w}\) is convex-valued. Furthermore, we define a property \(S^*\) by letting \(S^*(Y)\) be the set of existence problems \(G\in \mathbb {G}_u\) such that \(G\) is compact, convex and continuously reducible secure on \(Y\). We then obtain the following analog of Theorem 6: If \(K\in \mathbb {K}(X)\), \(G\in S^*(K)\) and \(w\) is such that \(G\) is continuously reducible secure on \(K\) relative to \(w\), then \(G_w\in W(K)\) and \(E_K(G_w)=\emptyset \).

  10. The games in these examples have finitely-valued payoff functions. Since, in this case, reducible security relative to \(\bar{u}\) coincides with the lower single-deviation property, it follows that the same conclusions hold regarding the lower single-deviation property.

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Correspondence to Guilherme Carmona.

Additional information

I wish to thank Paulo Barelli, Pavlo Prokopovych, Phil Reny, Nicholas Yannelis, three referees and seminar participants at Nova School of Business and Economics, SAET 2011 and Games 2012 for very helpful comments. Financial support from Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (under grant PTDC/EGE-ECO/105415/2008) is gratefully acknowledged.

Appendix

Appendix

In this section, and for completeness, we state and prove Barelli and Soza’s (2009) gluing lemma (Lemma 5.2 of that paper).

Lemma 3

Let \(X\) be a nonempty, compact and convex subset of a Hausdorff locally convex topological vector space, \(K\) be a compact subset of \(X\), \(\lambda :K\rightrightarrows X\) be convex-valued and, for each \(x\in K\), \(U^x\) be an open neighborhood of \(x\) and \(\varphi ^x:U^x\rightrightarrows X\) be a closed correspondence with nonempty, compact and convex values such that \(\varphi ^x(x')\subseteq \lambda (x')\) for all \(x'\in U^x\). Then there exists a closed correspondence \(\Psi :K\rightrightarrows X\) with nonempty, compact and convex values such that \(\Psi (x)\subseteq \lambda (x)\) for all \(x\in K\).

Proof

For each \(x\in K\), define \(\psi ^x:K\rightrightarrows X\) by

$$\begin{aligned} \psi ^x(x')=\left\{ \begin{array}{l@{\quad }l} \varphi ^x(x') &{}\quad \text {if }x'\in U^x,\\ X &{}\quad \text {otherwise} \end{array} \right. \end{aligned}$$

for each \(x'\in K\) and note that \(\psi ^x\) is a closed correspondence with nonempty, compact and convex values. We have that \(\{U^x,\varphi ^x\}_{x\in K}\) is such that \(\{U^x\}_{x\in K}\) is an open cover of \(K\). Since \(K\) is compact, there exists a finite open cover \(\{U^{x_j}\}_{j=1}^m\) of \(K\) and, by Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 2.92, p. 67), there exists a partition of unity \(\{\beta _j\}_{j=1}^m\) subordinate to \(\{U^{x_j}\}_{j=1}^m\). Define \(\Psi :K\rightrightarrows X\) by \(\Psi (x)=\sum \nolimits _{j=1}^m\beta _j(x)\psi ^{x_j}(x)\). It is easy to see that \(\Psi \) is a closed correspondence with nonempty, compact and convex values.

Let \(x\in K\) and define \(J(x)=\{j\in \{1,\ldots ,m\}:x\in U^{x_j}\}\). Since \(\beta _j(x)=0\) for all \(j\not \in J(x)\), \(\psi ^{x_j}(x)=\varphi ^{x_j}(x)\subseteq \lambda (x)\) if \(j\in J(x)\) and \(\lambda (x)\) is convex, it follows that \(\Psi (x)=\sum \nolimits _{j\in J(x)}\beta _j(x)\varphi ^{x_j}(x)\subseteq \lambda (x)\). This completes the proof.\(\square \)

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Carmona, G. Reducible equilibrium properties: comments on recent existence results. Econ Theory 61, 431–455 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0842-y

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