Abstract
We study the non-renewals of contracts in the farmland differential assessment program of California. An instrumental variable random-effect model for the location of non-renewals and a hazard model for the timing of non-renewals indicate that counties with high property tax rates have 0.8% lower odds of a non-renewal, transition slower to a rapid state of non-renewals by 4%, and transition faster to the slow state by 6%. This suggests differential assessment programs provide benefits to tax payers by preserving agricultural land and reducing how quickly development pressure causes non-renewals, and ultimately development, in farm communities. Counties at higher elevations transition faster to a rapid state of non-renewals by 4% and transition slower to the slow state by 2%. This suggests there should be more attention to development pressure at higher elevations, where regulations are weaker and amenities are greater.
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Kovacs, K. An empirical examination of the location and timing of non-renewals in a farmland differential assessment program. Ann Reg Sci 50, 245–263 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-011-0474-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-011-0474-0