Skip to main content
Log in

Primitive worlds

  • Published:
Acta Analytica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Modal Dimensionalism is a metaphysical theory about possible worlds that is naturally suggested by the often-noted parallelism between modal logic and tense logic. It says that the universe spreads out not only in spatiotemporal dimensions but also in a modal dimension. It regards worlds as nothing more or less than indices in the modal dimension in the way analogous to the way in which Temporal Dimensionalism regards temporal points and intervals as indices in the temporal dimension. Despite its naturalness and intuitive appeal. Modal Dimensionalism has been largely ignored while the debates between David Lewis and his critics have dominated the discourse on the nature of possible worlds. It is high time that we took Modal Dimensionalism seriously as a viable alternative.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Adams, R. 1974: ‘Theories of Actuality’,Nous 8, 211–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Camap, R. 1947:Meaning and Necessity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cresswell, M. 1972: ‘The World is Everything That is the Case’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50, 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forrest, P. 1986: ‘Ways Worlds Could Be’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 15–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grim, P. 1991:The Incomplete Universe, Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book, MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. 1980:Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. 1973:Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. 1983:Philosophical Papers I, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, D. 1986:On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan, W. 1979: ‘The Trouble with Possible Worlds’,The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality, Loux, M. (ed.), Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 274–316.

    Google Scholar 

  • Plantinga, A. 1974:The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, N. 1996: ‘Trans-World Identification and Stipulation’,Philosophical Studies 84, 203–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shalkowski, S. 1994: ‘The Ontological Ground for the Alcthic Modality’,Philosophical Review 103, 669–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stalnaker, R. 1976: ‘Possible Worlds’,Nous 10, 65–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quine, W. 1976: ‘Worlds Away’,Journal of Philosophy 73, 859–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zalta, E. 1987: ‘On the Structural Similarities Between Worlds and Times’,Philosophical Studies 51, 213–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Yagisawa, T. Primitive worlds. Acta Analytica 17, 19 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03177505

Download citation

  • Received:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03177505

Keywords

Navigation