Abstract
This paper builds upon previous work on the economics of lottery adoption by incorporating the collective action logic developed in an important series of works by Mancur Olson. Public choice research points out that legislators are rational maximizers, and act within a costbenefit framework in attempting to implement means of budget finance. Discrete-time hazard models presented suggest that lottery adoption is more likely to occur in older states where rent seeking groups are older and more organized, and can more effectively engage in efforts for collective action (and benefits). By implementing lotteries as taxshifting mechanisms, the role of, government and the direction of social evolution are also altered.
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Mixon, F.G., Caudill, S.B., Ford, J.M. et al. The rise (or fall) of lottery adoption within the logic of collective action: Some empirical evidence. J Econ Finance 21, 43–49 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02929021
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02929021