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Of course if one believes in God’s conserving activity then in the case of God and the world one believes that there is no possibility, either logically or factually, that the world can continue to exist apart from God’s conserving activity. In the case of the drinker and the fountain, one does not assume logically or factually that the fountain of water could not exist apart from the drinker etc. However, simple restrictions can be stipulated for the example of the fountain to make it more congruous with the case of the world depending for its perdurance upon God, not logically speaking but as a matter of fact — the fountain never breaks, there is only one drinker etc.
Oakes’ interpretation of the modal character of their statements as logical rather than factual is not supported in any obvious way by the quotations he cites on pp. 107–108.
Oakes does not claim that the analogy necessarily holds. He does, however, think he has given good reasons for thinking that it does hold. See Oakes, p. 110.
See, J. L. Mackie,The Cement of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 31–32. Mackie says, … are there cases where we wouldnot say that X caused Y but would say that X and Y both occurred and that in the circumstances Y would not have occurred if X had not? Would we not have to say the latter, trivially, if X and Y were identical? …But events … are not commonly said to cause themselves. Equally, the penny could not have fallen heads-up if it had not fallen tails-down; but we would not say that its falling tails down caused its falling heads-up. Again, the driver would not in the circumstances have broken the law if he had not exceeded the speed limit: but we would not say that his exceeding the speed limit caused his breaking the law. To exclude all such counter-examples, we would say that, in addition to the meaning suggested above. ‘X caused Y’ presupposes that X and Y are distinct events, and, as the last two examples show, this must be taken in a stronger sense than merely that ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are logically or conceptually independent descriptions. Indeed, it is not even necessary, anymore than it is sufficient for this purpose, that these should be logically independent descriptions. It is legitimate, though trivial, to say that X caused every effect of X…what is required is that the cause and effect should be, as Hume says, distinct existences. It may be objected that this requirement is vague or obscure, but it is not, I think, necessary for me to aim at any great precision here. I am discussing only what causal statements mean, and for this purpose it is sufficient to say that someone will not be willing to say that X caused Y unlesshe regards X and Y as distinct existences.
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Levine, M. Why traditional theism does not entail pantheism. SOPH 23, 13–20 (1984). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780845
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02780845